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 VIGILANTES V. PIRATES  
THE RUMBLE OVER PEER-TO-PEER TECHNOLOGY HITS THE 
HOUSE FLOOR*  
As new file transfer technologies rise in the wake of Napster’s demise, 
Congress considers a bill that would enable copyright owners to use self-
help measures to impair piracy of their works over online peer-to-peer 
networks. This iBrief evaluates the need for the proposed act and its 
implications for privacy and fair use. 
Overview 
On July 25, 2002, the Berman Bill1 was tossed into the congressional pool, but despite its 
rather meteoric implications for privacy, the bill caught little public attention outside the circling 
policy-hawks of the tech community.  Hailed by some as a congressional call for a “posse of 
copyright vigilantes,”2 the bi-partisan “Hollywood Hacking Bill”3 erects a safe harbor for 
copyright owners to engage in self-enforcement of their copyrights by disabling, interfering with, 
or impairing the distribution of copyrighted materials via popular peer-to-peer (P2P) transfer 
systems like Music City, KaZaA, and other Napster progeny.4 
Congressman Howard L. Berman, the lead sponsor of the bill, was the immediate subject 
of press scrutiny.  His 26th district of California consisting of North Hollywood, San Fernando, 
and other prime areas in Los Angeles, is home to giants of the entertainment industry who have 
substantially funded his re-election war chest.5  While some critics are resigned to the fact that 
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1 See H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002), available at 
bin/query/D?c107:2:./temp/~c107UFnOAA (July 25, 2002). The bill has sometimes been more 
formally dubbed the Peer to Peer Privacy Prevention Act. 
2 Statement by Ellen Stroud, representative of Streamcast Networks, the company that created the 
Morpheus P2P file sharing technology and operates MusicCity.com. See Rebecca Gray, Berman’s 
Bill Faces Opposition Online, AVN ONLINE, July, 10, 2002, at 
http://www.avnonline.com/issues/200207/newsarchive/071002_lead.shtml. 
3 Declan McCullagh, Hollywood Hacking Bill Hits House, NEWS.COM,July 25, 2002, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-946316.html.  
4 See H.R. 5211 at § 514(a). 
5 Congressman Berman’s top five contributors are Walt Disney Co., AOL Time Warner, Vivendi 
Universal, Viacom Inc., and News Corp. See opensecrets.org, Howard L. Berman (D-CA): Top 
Contributors, at 
 Berman is indeed representing the interests of his district, privacy aficionados are repulsed by the 
thought of Congress permitting anyone, let alone Hollywood, to interfere with their file sharing 
pastime.  They decry the Berman Bill as “an invitation to online-lawlessness” and “a declaration 
of cyber warfare on consumers.”6  In fact, there is nothing conceptually wrong with purpose of 
the Berman Bill: copyright owners should be permitted to protect their legally granted interests by 
technological means so long as the methods employed do not cause harm.  This principle of self-
help is well established in our legal tradition in such doctrines as recapture of chattel, 
repossession, and foreclosure. 
Yet, Congress is perhaps too often convinced that the road to re-election is paved with 
good intentions.  Such is the flawed reality of the Berman Bill.  While the bill does effectively 
legitimize the employment of certain methods to disrupt illegal file swapping and limit 
nonconsensual damage to files and data, if enacted without amendment, the act will throw open 
the door for a numerous defensible privacy intrusions that will greatly increase the burden of 
personal computer security and otherwise seriously threaten what’s left of the personal in PC.  
Problems Posed by P2P Technology 
File transfer technology over the Internet may be roughly divided into three categories: 
client/server communications, hybrid P2P computing, and pure P2P computing.7  The 
client/server model exists under the most traditional network technology.  Individual computers 
communicate with central servers that control, coordinate and manage client requests.8  In such 
cases, communication between individual computers is indirect and the server operates as a 
central conduit for information transfers.9 
Hybrid P2P computing is an initial movement away from the client/server model towards 
decentralization.10  Under hybrid technology, a central server may perform some but not all of the 
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 functions required under the client/server model.11  The most notable example of hybrid P2P 
computing is Napster.12  Under the technology employed in Napster, a person seeking a particular 
song would have to initially operate through a centralized Napster server where a directory of all 
the available files was stored.13  As soon as the file was located in the directory, the individual 
computers could initiate a file transfer without additional server assistance.14 Thus, some 
functions that were originally performed by the centralized server could now be performed by the 
individual “peer” computers.  
Pure P2P computing is at the farthest end of the spectrum of decentralized 
communications. In this model, each computer functions independent of a centralized server.15 
The information transfers are autonomous and exercise substantial control over the services they 
utilize.16 Pure P2P computing is currently in limited use and is most notably associated with the 
Freenet Project, a transfer system first proposed in a research paper developed by Ian Clarke at 
the University of Edinburgh.17 The Freenet system is designed to permit efficient use of 
bandwidth, free personal Internet publishing, and most notably, uncensorable dissemination of 
controversial information.18 
The practical effects of decentralized P2P file swapping are easy to foresee.  A legal 
attack on one computer is but an attack on one of millions of peer computers.  Thus, while the 
recording industry had a newsworthy victory in enjoining the centralized music giant Napster, 
filing suit against the millions of users of decentralized P2P technology is entirely impracticable.  
In a demonstration of free-market entry that would raise a toothy grin from Milton Friedman 
himself, shortly after Napster’s timely demise, the new Morpheus system which further 
decentralized P2P systems came to popularity on alternative file swapping networks.19  Morpheus 
features a “supernode” that automatically moves any index on any server interrupted or disabled, 
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 for example, by court injunction, to another location on the web.20 Therefore, as P2P technology 
is refined, it has the capability to render copyright owners legally helpless.  
To the extent current decentralization technology falls short in preserving the free 
distribution of copyrighted materials, by nature the Internet has other means with which to 
frustrate copyright holders and their traditional enforcement mechanisms. For example, though 
the Federal Wire Act21 prohibits the operation of Internet sportsbook sites,22 entering an elusive 
domain name like www.gambling.com will raise the homepage of the Online Gambling Directory 
and Casino Guide, providing Americans with links to hundreds of sportsbook sites run offshore 
from unregulated Caribbean retreats.23  Information once restricted from public access by statute 
has also been moved offshore.  For instance, at www.publicdata.com.ai, based in Anguilla, you 
can purchase select voter rolls and criminal files otherwise subject to strict confidentiality 
limitations.24  
Regulatory arbitrage, the movement between jurisdictions to take advantage of favorable 
regulatory systems, is rather troubling and very real in the Internet age, with some traditional 
systems of regulation being undermined entirely by the free flow of data across national 
boundaries.25 However, lawmakers remain unconvinced of the need to upgrade traditional 
concepts of jurisdiction to rein in the web, rather choosing to resign their dilemmas to 
imperfections in the resolution of conflict of laws, a greater need for private ordering and other 
problems that will be mitigated by time and experience with Internet technologies.26 However, 
wealthy campaign donors in Congressman Berman’s district like the membership of the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) are not so willing to stand idle while their revenues stream untapped through their own 
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 cable modems.27  Since they can no longer enforce their copyrights in America’s courtrooms, 
they have lobbied intensely for the right to take to the streets to reclaim their intangibles. 
The Berman Bill 
The political response is the Berman Bill, legislation introduced in the house in late July 
to erect a safe harbor for self-enforcement actions by copyright owners.  The act specifically 
provides that any copyright owner may impair the distribution or reproduction of their 
copyrighted work on a public P2P file sharing network so long as the copyright owner does not, 
without consent, impair the integrity of the data residing on the file sharer’s computer.28  The safe 
harbor is also lost should the copyright owner (i) unreasonably impair the accessibility to the P2P 
network of any file in which the copyright owner does not have a copyright interest under 17 
U.S.C. §106; (ii) cause economic loss to any other P2P file trader; (iii) cause economic loss in 
excess of $50.00 per impairment; (iv) fail to notify the Department of Justice seven days in 
advance of the technology employed to impair distribution or reproduction; or (v) fail to notify 
the file trader, upon request, the reason for an impairment, the impairer’s contact information, and 
the file trader’s right of action under the bill.29 The bill goes on to set out a non-exclusive cause of 
action for damages, including attorney’s fees, to be adjudged against a copyright owner who fails 
to qualify for the safe harbor protections.30 
Self-enforcement mechanisms like the Berman Bill are not an unpopular response to 
traditional legal violations presented in the context of new technology.  For example, the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”), though sluggish in the adoption and 
ratification process, provides for the prevention of use and retaking of software after an agreed or 
material breach of an end-user or licensing agreement.31  And why should self-enforcement be so 
objectionable? After all, as discussed supra, the Internet suffers from a chronic want of effective 
enforcement mechanisms and P2P computing has been widely popularized solely because it 
enables users to thwart the legal interests of copyright holders.  Indeed, within the context of 
music file sharing, it is often more cumbersome to increase decentralization by assigning server 
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 functions to peer computers than a central server.32  Thus P2P technologies are being redesigned, 
even more inefficiently, to circumvent legal interests.33  
P2P technology, however, should not be banned because (as Congressman Berman, “a 
big fan of P2P networks and technology behind them”34 recognizes) P2P computing possesses 
significant legitimate applications.35  Additionally, the principle of technological neutrality, that 
no technology should gain regulatory preference, has provided the foundation for the expansion 
of the Internet and its derivative innovations and should be strictly maintained.36  The Berman 
safe harbor in no way limits the expansion of P2P computing; rather, it legally enables technology 
to restrict the types of file transfers that may take place to the benefit of copyright owners. 
While the Berman Bill does not specifically identify the anti-piracy technologies that it 
seeks to legitimize, some of the techniques that could be used are interdiction, redirection, and 
spoofing.37  Interdiction, more commonly known as a denial of service (“DoS”) attack, occurs 
when a large volume of file requests are directed at a single peer machine, causing it to slow and  
effectively arresting the downloading process.38  Redirection consists of index pollution; meaning 
that the index of files maintained on a P2P network is contaminated such that requests for 
copyrighted materials will return undesired, bogus files.39  Lastly, spoofing involves attaching 
nodes that contain corrupted content to a P2P network which will slow the downloading process 
by denying the pirate resources for other downloads.40  Of these three techniques, only the DoS 
attacks threaten to seriously impair the distribution of legitimate files because the process floods a 
particular peer computer with false requests impairing access to other, possibly legitimate, files. 
Redirection will only frustrate the distribution of legitimate files that look like copyrighted 
materials, for example, because they have a similar filename.  None of these techniques, however, 
require copyright owners to hack into personal files on a pirate’s PC.  
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 If an act of Congress, technologically neutral, can mitigate copyright infringement 
without significant harm in the form of impairing non-infringing data transfers or privacy 
intrusions, then what could possibly be the problem?  That many tech-savvy privacy aficionados 
have a general objection to the doctrine of copyright itself is an argument best saved for debate 
over the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909, in 1909, a time when the issue was seriously 
considered before Congress.  
Nevertheless, the act does fail to prevent significant harm to P2P file traders in a number 
of ways, foremost by concealing privacy intrusions completely unrelated to the protection of 
copyright interests.  Congressman Berman has assured Americans that the bill does not allow 
copyright owners to lawfully hack or crack into the personal files of P2P users,41 and in fact, it 
does not.  But in effect, the act has greatly increased the burden of individuals to prevent the 
access to and the copying of personal files by crackers from being a common, defensible 
occurrence.  Because the bill fails to specify exactly which techniques may be used to impair 
piracy, any technology registered with the DOJ (like redirection) that does not alter or impair the 
integrity of data residing on the file trader’s computer is permissible. Importantly, cracking 
(gaining access to files) alone does not alter or impair the integrity of anything residing on a 
computer and therefore meets the proposed bill’s qualifications as a technique entitled to safe 
harbor protections.  One cannot take any confidence that during the registration process the DOJ 
will prevent the use of more invasive but statutorily compliant methods (like cracking), because 
such agency discretion is not provided for in the bill.42 
Of course, the Berman Bill does not protect cracking to gain access to personal files.43 
Such an act is likely a violation of the Computer Fraud Act44 and in many other ways qualifies as 
tortious conduct.  Yet, the proposed bill threatens to alter the balance of the acceptability of 
privacy intrusions.  Individuals view the privacy of their PC in the same manner they view the 
privacy of their home.  Technological intrusions by government are met with the greatest 
skepticism and seen as the equivalent of wire-tapping.45 An intrusion by non-government 
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 personnel is simply incomprehensible to most and any cracking into a personal system is 
blanketed as wrong.  To legally bless some technological invasions implies, contrary to the 
current standard, that persons have a right under certain circumstances to essentially be inside 
another’s computer.  
The effects play out clearly enough in litigation.  For example, suppose a young and 
promising professor keeps his work on his laptop.  Two years later a pharmaceutical giant patents 
a product that simply could not have been created without bits of information obtained in the 
professor’s personal notes.  The professor sues for computer fraud and conversion amongst other 
causes and appropriately submits his complaint to the court.  The pharmaceutical giant denies that 
it obtained the information by cracking the professor’s computer, and alleges that it has been 
developing such technologies for years and has plenty of evidence to that effect.  The only 
evidence the professor can submit to the court with regards to the accessibility of his developing 
creation is that some crackers dug around in the professor’s computer for a few moments because 
he uses P2P network software.  All the crackers claim that they have been authorized by 
copyright owners to enforce §106 interests and that their techniques are authorized by the DOJ.   
Any link between the crackers and the pharmaceutical giant is too tenuous to be substantiated.  
Unfortunately, our professor may very well lose the case. Since the crackers had a reason to be 
inside the professor’s computer, it is incredibly difficult for the legal system to assign rights, 
obligations, and liability. Previously, cracking was unquestionably a wrong, now it is a matter of 
evidence.  
In moderation, we hope the professor is neurotic enough to own at least an off-the-shelf 
firewall system to protect his works, much as we hope to remember to lock the doors at night.  
Yet, it may be asking too much to convince the American public that there is a reason for 
someone to be in their unlit house at 2 a.m., or, as this bill permits, legally digging inside their 
PC.  If the Berman Bill is enacted in its current form, P2P file traders will have to trust in the 
ability of corporations to establish and enforce internal policies with regard to limiting cracking 
technology, and these, most likely, will fail.  Any legal action to follow will be disrupted by the 
inability of file traders to even generally establish what actions the crackers took while inside 
their PC where previously, the crackers had no right to be there at all.  
An equally troubling proposition of the Berman Bill is that it will allow a copyright 
owner to obtain a P2P file trader’s consent to impair the integrity of any computer data residing 
on the file trader’s computer.46  Microsoft’s XP End-User License Agreement specifies:   
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 Content providers are using the digital rights management technology 
contained in this product to protect the integrity of their content (“Secure 
Content”) so that their intellectual property, including copyright, in such 
content is not misappropriated… if you elect to download a license from 
the Internet which enables your use of Secure Content, Microsoft may, in 
conjunction with such license, also download onto your computer such 
security updates that a secure content owner has requested that Microsoft 
distribute.47 
These End-User License Agreements have generally been found binding since the 
Seventh Circuit decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg.48  However, one could currently argue as to 
whether consent obtained via click-wrap agreements is sufficient to authorize someone to impair 
the integrity of computer data.49 After all, it does shock one’s conscience to imagine a PC user 
permitting another to sift through personal computer files and even delete them at any point in 
time, especially in light of the fact the deletion may, at great cost to the P2P user, be in error.50 
Yet, now the Berman Bill explicitly suggests permitting such self-inflicted harm if consent is 
obtained.51  Should a user download any software, a third-party agreement between that software 
provider and Microsoft may result in the user downloading unwanted, privacy intrusive files or 
programs onto her hard drive.  
Loading complete software applications on a computer makes the task of monitoring a 
user’s content that much easier for copyright owners.  They merely have to pre-install a program, 
likely in the form of a Trojan, in connection with any other software download that a user has 
                                                 
47 See also Ed Foster, Check the Fine Print, INFO WORLD, Sept. 13, 2002 (discussing the 
automatic update features in Microsoft’s end user and volume purchaser license agreements), at  
http://www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/02/02/11/020211opfoster.xml. 
48 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.1996). But see Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339-40 (D. 
Kan. 2000) (rejecting license agreement because the purchaser did not consent to the additional 
terms enclosed in the software box under U.C.C. § 2-207). 
49 See SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(recognizing that precedent has found shrinkwrap agreements as generally unconscionable 
contracts of adhesion); I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 
(D. Mass. 2002) (“To be sure, shrinkwrap and clickwrap license agreements share the defect of 
any standardized contract -- they are susceptible to the inclusion of terms that border on the 
unconscionable …”); U.C.C. §2-302; Cf. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. at 1339-40 (rejecting license 
agreement because the purchaser did not consent to the additional terms enclosed in the software 
box under U.C.C. § 2-207); Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, 831 F.Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 
1993) (same); Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.Supp. 91, 99-103 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
(same). But see Specht v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 150 F.Supp. 2d 585, 594 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) 
(finding click-wrap agreements generally enforceable); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997) (upholding an arbitration forum 
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 consented to and such will permit them to regularly monitor individual computers.52  This back 
door enforcement by copyright owners will likely increase the vulnerability of the computer 
system to third-party crackers – those not designated to enforce copyright interests – and will 
easily provide the ability to survey and remove other computer files, whether or not they relate to 
copyright interests.53  
Even if one assumes that all copyright owners will use the safe harbor only to the extent 
necessary to protect their interests, the bill nonetheless threatens to disturb a delicate balance 
between the interests of copyright and fair use. Under the proposed legislation, copyright owners 
are specifically empowered to impair the distribution and reproduction of files containing 
portions of their works regardless of whether such portions are excepted from copyright under the 
doctrine of fair use.54  Thus, the Berman Bill may join and work in conjunction with other 
legislation like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,55 the Copyright Term Extension Act,56 and 
UCITA in further extending the reaches of copyright protection.57  Also in this light, the bill 
threatens to destroy one of the principal benefits of P2P technology, its service as a font of future 
creation by facilitating the free flow of ideas and speech between persons. To that end, the 
Berman Bill may be more than bad policy—it may be unconstitutional.58 
Conclusion 
Perhaps it is too early to get too worked up over Hollywood’s efforts to consecrate its 
own anti-piracy efforts.  There is little time left in the 107th Congress, likely too short a period 
for a bill of significant privacy implications, which this act will eventually be discovered as, from 
making its way out of committee and to the President’s desk.  When a final self-enforcement bill 
comes to light, it may limit private action to certain anti-piracy technologies and may (though not 
likely) not be so supportive of the consensual impairment of files and the impairment of fair use 
works. Such revisions, however, would surely meet with many objections from the MPAA and 
RIAA and may render the act useless given the limitations of current impairment technologies. 
Most certainly, the Berman Bill should not be cast aside as a legislative fluke with great haste; it 
is likely to rear its head again, if in altered form. So long as peer-to-peer technology continues to 
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 unabatedly burn a hole in the pockets of the motion picture, recording, and software industries 
with traditional enforcement systems standing by the wayside, privacy buffs can expect to face a 
bi-partisan Congress willing at least to consider providing a level playing field for this battle over 
copyrights between vigilantes and pirates. 
By: Christopher Fazekas 
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